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Americans’ attitudes regarding homosexu-ality and gay rights have become increas-
ingly liberal (Loftus 2001). According to
General Social Survey data, as recently as 1990
over 75 percent of Americans believed that sex-
ual relations between two adults of the same sex
are “always wrong.” By 2004, the percentage
expressing that belief dropped to 57.6. Although
a majority of Americans continue to view homo-
sexuality as immoral or “wrong,” most also
approve of equal employment opportunities for
gays and lesbians. This support has grown
steadily for several decades (Fiorina, Abrams,
and Pope 2005; Loftus 2001). In spite of these
trends, Congress passed the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, which defines
marriage as “a legal union between one man and
one woman” and specifies that states do not
have to recognize same-sex marriages granted
in another state (Cahill 2004). This federal leg-
islation passed with nearly unanimous support
from Republican legislators and majority sup-
port from Democrats. Democratic President
Bill Clinton signed the bill into law. DOMA was
followed by a flurry of state-level activity, as leg-
islators sought to ban same-sex marriage or to
reinforce language in preexisting laws that made
same-sex marriage illegal (see Soule [2004] for
an analysis of the timing of state-level legisla-
tive bans on same-sex marriage from 1973 to
2000).
From 1998 to 2008, ballots in 30 states had
initiatives to ban same-sex marriage. As Table
1 shows, opponents of same-sex marriage
scored lopsided victories in most cases. Indeed,
a same-sex marriage ban was defeated in only
one state, Arizona (and by a very narrow mar-
gin). Only two years later, Arizona voters revis-
ited the issue and approved a constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage.
Although these voting outcomes reflect broad
opposition to same-sex marriage throughout
the U.S. population, state-level figures obscure
substantial variation in how local communities
have responded. Examining the voting data at
the county level, rather than the state level, we
find that support for a same-sex marriage ban
ranges from a low of 23 percent in the county
equivalent of Charlottesville, Virginia to a high
of 95.4 percent in Martin County, Texas.
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Voting data derived from these ballot initia-
tives provide a unique opportunity to examine
sources of support for, and opposition to, same-
sex marriage. The issue is important in its own
right because it involves a conflict over basic
civil liberties, and the ultimate outcome of the
conflict has implications for millions of les-
bians and gay men in the United States. Both
instrumental and symbolic goals are at stake.
Supporters of same-sex marriage seek equal
access to rights and privileges that heterosexu-
al married couples currently enjoy. Perhaps just
as important from the perspective of gay rights
supporters, legalizing same-sex marriage would
mean the government could no longer enforce
restrictions on marriage based on an under-
standing of homosexual unions as deviant and
illegitimate.
More generally, the voting data provide an
opportunity to examine how local communi-
ties’ structural features shape public opinion
on an important issue of contention. The fight
over same-sex marriage represents a competi-
tion over socially constructed meanings, as
groups and individuals on both sides of the
issue struggle to define the meanings of mar-
riage, sexuality, morality, and civil rights, and
to assert their own definitions of the situation
in the face of organized opposition. In our analy-
sis, we focus on communities (with counties as
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Table 1. State Ballot Initiatives Pertaining to Same-Sex Marriage
Percent in Favor of Same-Sex County County County County
State Year Marriage Ban (State Level) Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Alaska 1998 68.1 NA NA NA NA
Hawaii 1998 69.2 69.5 2.5 67.3 73.0
California 2000 61.4 66.5 12.1 31.9 82.2
Nebraska 2000 70.1 80.4 5.5 59.2 91.3
Nevada 2000 69.6 75.3 5.7 63.3 85.5
Nevada 2002 67.2 73.4 6.6 60.1 85.3
Arkansas 2004 75.0 77.8 4.0 65.4 84.3
Georgia 2004 76.2 84.8 5.8 52.0 93.7
Kentucky 2004 74.5 83.0 7.3 57.1 93.8
Louisiana 2004 77.8 82.7 6.8 54.6 93.8
Michigan 2004 58.6 63.8 5.6 40.6 74.0
Mississippi 2004 85.6 86.9 5.2 67.0 94.1
Missouri 2004 70.6 79.7 6.6 47.0 89.1
Montana 2004 66.6 74.2 6.9 51.5 84.9
North Dakota 2004 73.2 79.4 5.6 61.9 88.1
Ohio 2004 61.7 68.5 6.6 44.2 79.8
Oklahoma 2004 75.6 80.1 3.6 68.8 87.6
Oregon 2004 56.6 65.5 9.4 40.3 78.2
Utah 2004 65.9 71.6 10.5 38.6 82.0
Kansas 2005 69.9 79.1 8.0 37.1 91.1
Texas 2005 76.3 87.1 6.9 40.1 95.4
Alabama 2006 81.2 82.8 5.7 67.4 91.3
Arizona 2006 48.2 52.2 6.8 40.5 68.8
Colorado 2006 55.0 60.6 12.9 29.2 79.1
Idaho 2006 63.3 68.4 10.3 33.7 89.1
South Carolina 2006 78.0 81.5 5.4 64.8 90.3
South Dakota 2006 51.8 52.6 5.9 34.7 71.1
Tennessee 2006 81.3 86.2 4.1 68.0 92.3
Virginia 2006 57.0 63.8 12.7 23.0 89.9
Wisconsin 2006 59.4 63.8 7.0 33.1 75.9
Arizona 2008 56.2 64.1 9.6 49.2 80.0
California 2008 52.3 56.7 13.4 24.9 75.4
Florida 2008 61.9 71.4 10.5 48.0 89.4
Note: The authors collected voting data from each state’s Secretary of State Web site.
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proxies) rather than individuals because opin-
ions on same-sex marriage are formed through
social interaction. Varying understandings of
same-sex marriage develop through life-long
socialization processes and are constructed and
reconstructed in everyday conversations in
churches, college campuses, coffee shops, work-
places, and bowling alleys. The nature of these
conversations, and the ways in which various
arguments about same-sex marriage resonate
with individuals, should depend on varying pat-
terns of social relations across local contexts. We
identify structural features of local settings that
affect the extent to which same-sex marriage is
perceived to be threatening to (1) community
residents’ interests and values and (2) the com-
munity as a whole.
As Eskridge and Spedale (2006) note, some
opponents of same-sex marriage express their
opposition simply on definitional grounds.
Marriage is understood as a union of one man
and one woman, and no other type of arrange-
ment, from this perspective, should be permis-
sible under law. Increasingly, however,
opponents of same-sex marriage have articu-
lated a consequentialist argument, claiming that
same-sex marriage is not only wrong on moral
grounds but would also harm society (Eskridge
and Spedale 2006). We argue that traditional
gender roles and family structure promote oppo-
sition to same-sex marriage and that these
effects should be particularly strong in loca-
tions where many residents are not deeply root-
ed in the community. Traditionalism, we
propose, leads many community residents to
view homosexuality as a threat to their interests
and values. In communities where many indi-
viduals feel threatened by homosexuality, weak
community cohesion can contribute to a general
sense that same-sex marriage would further
undermine the community’s social fabric.
When we use the phrase “weak community
cohesion,” we are thinking of circumstances in
which many community residents do not feel a
strong attachment to their neighborhoods, towns,
or cities and are likely to be unfamiliar with
many individuals with whom they have con-
tact throughout the day. These conditions, as
Durkheim (1933) and Simmel (1950) pointed
out long ago, while weakening pressure toward
conformity, can also undermine trust, solidari-
ty, and a commitment to the collective good.
THREAT TO INTEREST AND VALUES
Although attitudes about gay rights are becom-
ing increasingly liberal, a sizeable proportion of
Americans oppose same-sex marriage simply
because they oppose homosexuality. Certainly,
many Americans continue to reject same-sex
marriage on definitional grounds and do not feel
compelled to offer further justification. We
expect that these attitudes are clustered within
communities characterized by traditional fam-
ily structures and gender roles. As Jackman
(1994:59) argues, groups tend to gravitate “to
ideologies that are rationally consistent with
their interests,” and we believe the same is true
in regard to how they form opinions regarding
same-sex marriage. This does not mean that all
opponents of same-sex marriage adhere to a
single coherent and systematic set of beliefs, or
that they deliberately promote such a belief sys-
tem to gain a strategic advantage for their group.
Instead, we think that arguments that speak of
the importance of preserving traditional mar-
riage are more likely to “ring true” in commu-
nities where traditional gender and family
arrangements predominate.
Psychological studies show that, at the indi-
vidual level, prejudiced attitudes toward homo-
sexuals are correlated with adherence to
traditional sex roles (Basow and Johnson 2000;
Cotton-Huston and Waite 2000; Polimeni,
Hardie, and Buzwell 2000).1 Individuals who
adhere to traditional sex roles typically devel-
op a stake in maintaining the status quo. They
may view lesbians and gay men as economic
threats, as some heterosexual individuals believe
that gay rights will lead to special treatment or
reverse discrimination (Bernstein, Kostelac, and
Gaarder 2003; Stein 2001). Heterosexual men,
who derive a broad array of benefits by embody-
ing masculine traits, may feel that homosexu-
ality represents a threat to male privilege
(Bernstein 2004). Many women and men who
adhere to traditional gender roles may also
believe that same-sex marriage undermines the
institution of marriage and devalues the status
associated with heterosexual marriage
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1 Much of this research uses the term “homopho-
bia” to characterize negative attitudes. But as Herek
(2000) points out, this word includes an assumption
about the underlying causes of the attitudes that may
not be valid.
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(Bernstein 2004). We expect opposition to same-
sex marriage to be strong, therefore, where a
large proportion of the population has a personal
stake in maintaining traditional gender roles
and family structures.
Yet the geographic concentration of opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage represents more than
a simple clustering of individual traits and pre-
dispositions. Britton (1990), for example, argues
that negative attitudes toward homosexuals are
rooted in sex-segregated social arrangements.
Drawing on the ideas of Lipman-Blumen
(1976), Britton (1990:425) proposes the fol-
lowing:
A stratification system in which males and all-male
institutions have almost exclusive access to major
resources reinforces same-sex interest. Men
homosocial in outlook prefer other men’s compa-
ny and also work to maintain all-male institutions.
The relationship to homophobia lies in maintain-
ing the boundary between social and sexual inter-
action in a homosocially stratified society.
According to this logic, traditional gender
roles and family structures should foster nega-
tive attitudes toward both homosexuality and
same-sex marriage due to the prevalence of
social norms and practices that reinforce bound-
aries and maintain sex-based power differentials.
Other research calls attention to how net-
work ties to lesbians or gay men tend to reduce
sexual prejudice among heterosexuals
(Bernstein et al. 2003; Herek and Capitanio
1996). In the absence of such ties, negative
stereotypes and myths pertaining to homosex-
uality may go unchallenged (Bernstein 2004;
Herek 1991). In communities where tradition-
al gender roles and family structures predomi-
nate, individuals are less likely to have contact
with people who openly express a gay or lesbian
identity. In this context, individuals should be
more likely to hold negative stereotypes and to
view homosexuality as immoral and threaten-
ing to the privileges they enjoy.
THREAT TO COMMUNITY
Consequentialist arguments against same-sex
marriage characterize traditional marriage as
an “altruistic space” wherein adults subordi-
nate their own self-interest to their children’s
welfare. This altruistic space serves an impor-
tant public function, “as it trains good citi-
zens, rears superior children, and creates
greater happiness in the long run” (Eskridge
and Spedale 2006:28–29). The argument attrib-
utes numerous social ills to the decline of the
traditional family in modern society and inter-
prets same-sex marriage as a serious threat
that will further undermine the family unit’s
altruistic functions. For example, Blankenhorn
(2007:96–97) argues that acceptance of same-
sex marriage necessarily undermines marriage
as a social institution, which is, he asserts,
“not a ‘bundle of rights,’ but a pattern of rules
and structures intended to meet societal needs.”
Stein’s (2001) study of opposition to gay
rights in a small Oregon town shows how con-
servatives use consequentialist arguments
against same-sex marriage. Community
activists opposed gay rights on religious
grounds, but they recognized that to expand
their base of support they would need to appeal
to individuals leery of imposing one set of
religious values on all citizens. Stein calls
attention to how conservatives tapped into a
general sense that gay rights pose a threat to
an already fragile community cohesion. The
mayor of the small Oregon town, for example,
lamented: “It used to be that people social-
ized in groups. Today, people are more isolat-
ed. There’s less interconnectedness” (Stein
2001:64).
In a study of attitudes about homosexuali-
ty, Persell, Green, and Gurevich (2001:213)
argue that a breakdown in civil society under-
mines trust and promotes intolerance. While
Persell and colleagues studied individuals’ atti-
tudes, their findings are consistent with Stein’s
observations about opposition to gay rights in
Oregon. As Stein (2001:215) writes, a gener-
al sense that social cohesion was weakening led
many in the community to fear the “strangers”
in their midst: “Talk of community surfaces
most when communities are under threat—
and frequently leads people on quests to repair
them.”
Opponents of same-sex marriage view the
traditional family as the primary institution
for socializing children and for maintaining
social order and community cohesion. Same-
sex marriage is seen as a threat to traditional
marriage and, by extension, to moral and cohe-
sive communities. Florida Congressman
Charles Canaday exemplified this view when
arguing on behalf of the Defense of Marriage
Act in 1996:
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What is at stake in this controversy? Nothing less
than our collective moral understanding—as
expressed in the law—of the essential nature of the
family—the fundamental building block of soci-
ety. This is far from a trivial political issue. Families
are not merely constructs of outdated convention,
and traditional marriage laws were not based on
animosity toward homosexuals. Rather, I believe
that the traditional family structure—centered on
a lawful union between one man and one woman—
comports with nature and with our Judeo-Christian
moral tradition. (The Congressional Record 1996)
In this perspective, by weakening the funda-
mental building block of society, same-sex mar-
riage would contribute to, or exacerbate, the
breakdown of social order.
Organized opponents of same-sex marriage
often express these types of concerns when jus-
tifying their intent to restrict gay and lesbian
individuals’ civil liberties. On its Web site, the
Family Research Council (2007), for example,
makes its case against same-sex marriage by
referring to research carried out by “a group of
thirteen leading social scientists.” The refer-
ence is to a report published by the Institute for
American Values (2002:18), which concludes:
Marriage is more than a private emotional rela-
tionship. It is also a social good. Not every person
can or should marry. And not every child raised
outside of marriage is damaged as a result. But
communities where good-enough marriages are
common have better outcomes for children,
women, and men than do communities suffering
from high rates of divorce, unmarried childbear-
ing, and high-conflict or violent marriages.
Not surprisingly, same-sex marriage oppo-
nents neglect to call attention to the fact that
scholars are divided on whether changes in fam-
ily structure lead to a decline in positive social
outcomes.2 Yet even if one takes such a report
at face value, it could just as easily be used to
advocate for, rather than against, same-sex mar-
riage. If marriage is a public good, why limit it
to heterosexual couples? The Family Research
Council (2007) responds to this question by
returning to the definitional argument against
same-sex marriage:
The benefits of marriage do not simply flow from
the presence of two people and government recog-
nition of their relationship. Instead, they flow from
the inherent complementarity of the sexes and the
power of lifelong commitment.
Only those who accept the initial premise—
that homosexual unions defy the laws of nature
and the laws of God—would f ind such a
response satisfying. For such individuals, how-
ever, the consequentialist argument provides
justification for restricting gays’ and lesbians’
rights because they interpret the preservation of
traditional marriage as a public good.
We do not expect to find that weak commu-
nity cohesion, by itself, generates opposition to
same-sex marriage. Indeed, weak cohesion that
results when many residents are not firmly root-
ed in a particular neighborhood, town, or city
can have a liberalizing effect. Anonymity
relieves pressure toward conformity (Durkheim
1933; Fischer 1995; McVeigh 1995; Simmel
1950). In many locales, weak community cohe-
sion is not broadly viewed as problematic and
would not provoke opposition to same-sex mar-
riage; even if community members view weak
cohesion as a problem, they would not regard
banning same-sex marriage as the solution.
However, traditional sex and gender roles with-
in a community can promote opposition to
same-sex marriage in a way that leads many to
see a breakdown in social organization as both
a cause and a consequence of nontraditional
values, including values that promote tolerance
of same-sex marriage. We therefore expect to
find strong opposition to same-sex marriage in
communities where traditional family struc-
tures and gender roles are most prevalent, and
the effects of these community attributes should
be particularly strong in settings characterized
by weak community cohesion.
DATA AND METHODS
To test our argument, we examine county-level
voting results in the 28 states that had same-sex
marriage initiatives on the ballot from 2000 to
2008. Because most of our independent vari-
ables are measured using data from the 2000
U.S. Census, we do not include earlier votes in
Alaska and Hawaii. For Arizona and California,
we use the results of earlier elections, rather
than the most recent elections in 2008, because
the earlier elections were conducted closer to the
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Sarkisian 2006; Giele 1996; Glenn 1993;
Houseknecht and Sastry 1996; Popenoe 1988.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
period used to measure our independent vari-
ables.3 Our dependent variable is the percent of
votes cast in each county in support of the same-
sex marriage ban. In all but one of the states in
the analysis, the ballot initiatives proposed to
amend the state constitutions so that marriage
would be explicitly limited to a union between
one man and one woman. California’s vote in
2000, unlike the more recent Proposition 8 in
that state, banned same-sex marriage but did not
amend the state constitution. In Nevada, the
issue appeared on the ballot in both 2000 and
2002 (in Nevada, an initiative to amend the
state constitution must be approved in two con-
secutive elections before it takes effect). In our
analyses, the measure of opposition to same-sex
marriage in Nevada’s counties represents the
average percentage of voters approving the ban
across the two election periods.
We are interested in identifying ways in which
attributes of local contexts influence the vote on
same-sex marriage. We use counties as units of
analysis because a state-level analysis would
ignore substantial intrastate variation in our rel-
evant variables. Conditions experienced by indi-
viduals in one part of a state can be quite
different from those experienced by residents
elsewhere in the state, and these differences
could be associated with attitudes toward same-
sex marriage. However, some of the variation
across counties is certainly attributable to state-
level differences. States phrase the ballot ini-
tiative questions differently and also differ in
their openness to alternatives to same-sex mar-
riage, such as state-sanctioned civil unions. In
addition, the elections occurred across an eight-
year time span, and the year in which an elec-
tion was held could be related to the results.
Failure to control for these and other state-level
effects could produce biased estimates. To
address this problem, we use a fixed-effects
model estimated with the AREG command in
Stata. The procedure, in effect, inserts a dummy
variable for each of the 28 states included in our
analysis. Our regression results thus represent
the estimated effects of our independent vari-
ables on opposition to same-sex marriage after
controlling for state-level differences in voting.
We also use robust standard errors for signifi-
cance testing to correct for unmeasured but sta-
ble state-level factors that may cause correlated
errors among observations within each state.
TRADITIONAL FAMILY STRUCTURE AND
GENDER ROLES
Opposition to same-sex marriage should be
strong in communities where traditional fami-
ly structure and gender roles are predominant.
We include two measures related to labor force
participation: (1) the percentage of women age
16 years and older who reported that they did
not work in 1999 and (2) a measure of occupa-
tional sex segregation. The 2000 Census breaks
county residents’ occupations into 93 group-
ings. We calculated an index of dissimilarity
with the value representing the proportion of
either men or women who would have to change
occupational categories to produce an even dis-
tribution of men and women across categories,
where sex is not correlated with occupation
(McVeigh and Sobolewski 2007).
We also include several variables related to
family structure, including the percentage of
households in a county composed of a married
couple with children under age 18. Of course,
we do not expect that all individuals in this tra-
ditional family arrangement will oppose same-
sex marriage. At the county level, however, we
expect to find that opposition to same-sex mar-
riage will be strongest where this traditional
family form is normative. We also include vari-
ables capturing variation in the presence of non-
traditional families, including the percentage
of households in a county composed of a house-
holder and a same-sex partner. This is a flawed
measure if the goal is to accurately assess the
prevalence of gay and lesbian households. Many
individuals, when filling out the short form of
the Census, are reluctant to reveal the nature of
their relationship to a same-sex partner, espe-
cially in communities where prejudice against
gays and lesbians is strongest. For our purpos-
es, however, the measure does help identify
county-level differences in the general openness
to same-sex relationships. Values for this vari-
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California in 2008 are highly correlated with earlier
voting results in those states. For California, the cor-
relation between the votes in 2008 and 2000 is .976.
For Arizona, the correlation between the votes in
2008 and 2006 is .811. We include the 2008 Florida
vote in our analyses, but the results are similar if
Florida is excluded.
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able represent some combination of the presence
of same-sex households and a willingness to
reveal such relationships when f illing out
Census forms. Where the percentage of same-
sex households is low, we expect to find stronger
opposition to same-sex marriage. Using the
same Census table, we also calculate a measure
of the percentage of households with either a
male householder and an unmarried female
partner, or a female householder with an unmar-
ried male partner. This measure, similar to the
measure of same-sex households, does not nec-
essarily provide an accurate tally of the pro-
portion of households made up of cohabiting
couples, but it does reflect a general openness
to nontraditional heterosexual households.
WEAK COMMUNITY COHESION
We include several variables related to com-
munity cohesion. Social disorganization theo-
ry proposes that residential instability can
disrupt social organization in communities and
loosen constraints on social behavior (Sampson
and Raudenbush 1999; Shaw and McKay 1942).
Residential instability, in this sense, can reduce
pressure toward conformity and have a liberal-
izing effect on community residents. However,
we expect that in communities where tradi-
tionalism is most prevalent, these same condi-
tions increase the chance that community
residents view same-sex marriage as threaten-
ing to both the community and their own inter-
ests and values. Using the 2000 Census, we
measure residential instability as the percentage
of individuals age 5 years and older who are liv-
ing in a residence different from the one in
which they lived five years earlier. Low rates of
home ownership can also be a source of weak
community cohesion (Krivo and Peterson 2000),
so we include the percentage of homes in a
county that are not owner-occupied.
We also include a measure of the crime rate.
Crime, of course, is a frequent topic of study for
social scientists. Rarely, however, do social sci-
entists treat crime as an independent variable.
Criminological research and theory suggest that
crime can result from social disorganization
(Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Sampson and Laub
1993; Shaw and McKay 1942). In the absence
of strong social bonds connecting members of
a community, individuals face fewer social con-
straints on criminal and delinquent behavior.
Crime, in other words, results from a break-
down in the social relations and common val-
ues that sustain healthy communities. Often left
unsaid is that a high crime rate is itself an indi-
cator of a breakdown in community cohesion
and solidarity (see Liska, Logan, and Bellair
1999; Quillian and Pager 2001; Rountree and
Land 1996).
Opponents of same-sex marriage sometimes
argue that legalizing same-sex marriage will
contribute to higher crime rates. Most of these
arguments, however, do not suggest that gay
individuals will be the ones committing these
crimes. Instead, opponents argue that legaliza-
tion will undermine the institution of marriage
and lead to poorer socialization of children. We
cannot say how widely accepted such beliefs are
among voters. In our analysis, we see crime
operating more as an additional indicator of
weak community cohesion that should be sim-
ilar to residential instability and low rates of
home ownership in terms of how it affects vot-
ing outcomes. A high crime rate indicates that
many individuals in a community feel uncon-
strained by ties to the community or its residents.
We constructed a measure of the crime rate
for the year 2000 using data provided by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR). We accessed the coun-
ty-level data through the Web site maintained by
the Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research (ICPSR). We calculated our
measure as the number of index crimes (i.e.,
murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, bur-
glary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson) for
every 1,000 residents reported for each county.
Unfortunately, concerns about data quality com-
pelled us to exclude 629 counties when includ-
ing the crime variable in our analyses. Therefore,
we estimate most of our models without the
crime variable but then estimate the effects of
the crime rate in separate models with a more
limited sample. See McVeigh (2006) for a
detailed discussion of the county-level UCR
data.4
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CONTROL VARIABLES
Some researchers argue that opposition to same-
sex marriage, and to homosexuality more gen-
erally, is most likely found in communities
where residents are struggling economically.
Persell and colleagues (2001), for example,
argue that economic hardship can undermine
civil society and trust and can decrease levels
of social tolerance. Other research suggests that
gay rights might be perceived as threatening in
working-class and less prosperous communities
where many residents may be receptive to argu-
ments about how policies designed to protect or
promote gay rights would lead to reverse dis-
crimination (Bernstein et al. 2003; Stein 2001).
Theories of status politics and status substitu-
tion (Gusfield 1963; Lipset and Raab 1970)
suggest that support for conservative values
represents a form of low-status backlash. We
control for features of the economic structure
that might be related to a vote in opposition to
same-sex marriage. The 2000 Census groups
occupations into six broad categories. To form
a measure of working-class or blue-collar
employment, we calculate the percentage of
workers employed in either of the following
two general categories: (1) construction, extrac-
tion, and maintenance and (2) production, trans-
portation, and material moving occupations.
We expect opposition to same-sex marriage to
be stronger in counties where high percentages
of workers are employed in these blue-collar
occupations. We construct another measure of
the percentage of individuals employed in pro-
fessional occupations, which we expect to be
negatively related to the dependent variable.
We also include a measure of the percentage of
households receiving self-employment income,
because the self-employed may be less likely to
be concerned about economic competition that
could result from an expansion of gay rights.
We also control for counties’median income
in 2000. As an additional indicator of econom-
ic conditions, we use Census data to obtain a
measure of the percentage of households receiv-
ing public assistance income in 1999. Research
consistently shows that education tends to pro-
duce more liberal attitudes regarding homo-
sexuality and gay rights (Herek and Glunt 1993;
Loftus 2001; Treas 2002). In recent decades,
increasing tolerance of homosexuality in the
population at large can be attributed, in part, to
increases in the number of individuals pursuing
higher education (Loftus 2001). We use 2000
Census data to obtain a measure of the mean
years of education for county residents age 25
and older. Above and beyond the effects of edu-
cation, many college campuses provide con-
texts conducive to gay rights activism and more
tolerant views about homosexuality (Wald,
Button, and Rienzo 1996). To capture this “col-
lege town” effect, we include a measure of the
percentage of county residents age 3 years and
older who are currently enrolled in college.5
Responses to same-sex marriage are also
likely related to urbanization and population
density. Using Census data for the year 2000, we
calculate the natural log of the population per
square mile. We also include a measure of the
percentage of county residents living in an urban
location. We expect to find stronger opposition
to same-sex marriage in counties where con-
servative belief systems are broadly accepted.
Therefore, we include a measure of the per-
centage of county voters who voted for
Republican presidential candidate George W.
Bush in the 2000 election. Party loyalty and
partisanship, as Campbell and colleagues (1960)
noted long ago, can act as a lens through which
all issues are viewed, interpreted, and under-
stood. Bush, and more generally the Republican
Party, appealed to voters by emphasizing their
support of traditional family values, and these
appeals solidified support for the party among
socially conservative voters (Coltrane 2001;
Oberschall 1993; Regnerus, Sikkink, and Smith
1999; Rudolph and Grant 2002).
Political advocacy of traditional family val-
ues has, to a great extent, been targeted toward
Evangelical Protestants, and several leaders of
Evangelical organizations and churches are out-
spoken opponents of same-sex marriage.
Evangelical Protestants are not homogeneous in
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county only if the population served by the report-
ing agencies represents at least 90 percent of the
total county population.
5 We also considered including a measure of unem-
ployment. This measure, however, has a weak bivari-
ate correlation with support for same-sex marriage
(r = .015), and in preliminary multivariate analyses,
we found that the unemployment rate is not a sig-
nificant predictor of support for same-sex marriage.
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terms of their beliefs about social issues, and as
a group they do not differ significantly from
other Americans on many political issues.
However, they do tend to be particularly con-
servative on issues related to homosexuality
and gay rights (Smith 2000).
We use data from the American Religion
Data Archive (ARDA) to calculate a measure of
Evangelical Protestants as a percentage of all
church adherents in each county in the year
2000. ARDA’s classification of denominations
as Evangelical is guided primarily by Steensland
and colleagues’ (2000) coding strategy and uses
information provided in the Encyclopedia of
American Religion and the Handbook of
Denominations in the United States to classify
the denominations not covered (ARDA 2005).
We use the same data source to calculate a
measure of the percentage of church adherents
who are Catholic. The Catholic Church teach-
es that any sexual act committed outside of het-
erosexual marriage is sinful and characterizes
homosexuality as a disorder (Loseke and
Cavendish 2001). Yet U.S. Catholics tend to be
more liberal than conservative Protestants on
issues related to gay rights (see Bendyna et al.
2001; Finlay and Walther 2003; Haider-Markel
and Meier 1996; Kellstedt et al. 1994). In fact,
data from the 2006 General Social Survey show
that while a minority of Catholics (34 percent)
agreed that homosexuals should have a right to
marry, only 26.3 percent strongly disagreed
with that statement, compared with 47.5 percent
of Protestants.
We include a measure of median age in a
county because prior research shows that older
individuals tend to have more conservative
views about homosexuality (Loftus 2001). It is
important, however, to keep in mind that a rel-
atively high median age does not necessarily
reflect high concentrations of elderly residents;
it may instead reflect a low fertility rate. We also
control for the percent of a county population
that is African American or Latino. Although
African Americans and Latinos tend to align
themselves with the Democratic Party, they also
tend to be more conservative than White
Democrats when it comes to views on homo-
sexuality.6 When considering the 2,231 counties
included in our analysis, our data show that
opposition to same-sex marriage is weakly cor-
related with our measure of percent Black (r =
.125) and percent Latino (r = .047). We expect
these relations to change when we control for
state-level differences and other factors related
to voting on same-sex marriage.
As Soule (2004) demonstrates, activist organ-
izations can influence public policy on issues
such as same-sex marriage (see also Burstein
1991; McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003;
Wald et al. 1996; Werum and Winders 2001).
Soule’s analysis uses state-level measures of
the presence or absence of interest groups
involved in the same-sex marriage debate. Our
fixed-effects models are designed to control for
these and other state-level differences. At the
county level, we include a dichotomous variable
coded 1 if a county has at least one lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender organization listed
under the “Act Locally” link on the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force’s Web site. We also
use data collected by the National Center for
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) to calculate the
number of nonprofit organizations coded from
R20 to R30 using the National Taxonomy of
Exempt Entities coding scheme. These cate-
gories consist of activist organizations engaged
in civil rights activism for specific groups and
organizations that aim to promote increased
harmony between groups. NCSS compiled the
data set using Internal Revenue Service records
for nonprofit organizations filing for tax exempt
status each year.7 Finally, we include a dichoto-
mous variable coded 1 if a county (or a city with-
in the county) enacted legislation prohibiting
discrimination in private employment based on
sexual orientation or gender identity prior to
2000.
INTERACTION EFFECTS
We argued that opposition to same-sex mar-
riage should be strong in counties characterized
VOTING TO BAN SAME-SEX MARRIAGE—–899
6 A poll taken by the Field Research Corporation
days before the 2008 vote on Proposition 8 in
California showed that among Latino and African
American likely voters, 46 and 49 percent, respec-
tively, supported the ban on same-sex marriage. This
is only slightly more than the percent of White non-
Hispanic likely voters who supported the ban (44 per-
cent).
7 See McVeigh (2006) for a more thorough descrip-
tion of this measure.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
by traditional gender roles and family structure
because many residents in these counties are
likely to view same-sex marriage as a threat to
their interests and values. We expect the effects
of traditionalism to be strongest in counties
with weak community cohesion, because under
these circumstances community residents are
likely to perceive same-sex marriage as threat-
ening not only to their own interests and values
but to the community at large. We examine sev-
eral interaction effects to test this argument. To
facilitate interpretation of the interaction effects,
we center all variables on their mean values.
DATA ANALYSIS
Our findings can be generalized only to coun-
ties in states where initiatives pertaining to
same-sex marriage have been on the ballot. To
date, 30 states have had such initiatives.
Geographic region and political party alliances
seem to be important factors in determining
which states have had same-sex marriage ini-
tiatives. With the exception of North Carolina,
all of the southern states have voted to ban
same-sex marriage. Of the 20 states that have
not had same-sex marriage initiatives on the
ballot, 18 gave majority support to Democrat
Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election
(West Virginia and Wyoming are the excep-
tions).8
The measures for all of our independent vari-
ables, as well as the data sources, are described
in the Appendix. Univariate statistics for all
variables and a matrix of Pearson correlation
coefficients are presented in Table A1 in the
Appendix. This table reveals some strong cor-
relations among our independent variables. In
preliminary analyses, we estimated all of our
models with Ordinary Least Squares regres-
sion and examined condition index values to
detect potential multicollinearity problems.
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) suggest that
condition index values ranging from 30 to 100
indicate moderate to strong multicollinearity,
and under such conditions there is a high like-
lihood that multicollinearity is harming or
degrading the regression estimates (see also
Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan 1996:679–80; Ross
1987:262). Even with state-level dummy vari-
ables included, the highest condition index value
in any of our models is 18.2.
Table 2 presents results of multivariate analy-
ses.9 The first two columns show results when
state-level effects are not controlled. The first
model excludes the crime rate variable and
therefore includes 2,231 counties. The second
model includes the crime variable. Because of
concerns about data quality, models including
the crime variable are limited to 1,602 counties.
In both models, the independent variables
explain over 70 percent of county-level varia-
tion in voting. Without controlling for state-
level effects, however, the coefficients could
be quite misleading if the goal is to show how
county-level attributes are related to voting out-
comes. Columns 3 and 4 show results with
state-level dummy variables included. In almost
all cases, the coefficients of the state-level vari-
ables are negative and statistically significant,
indicating that after controlling for numerous
county attributes, Texas counties have higher
levels of opposition to same-sex marriage than
do counties in other states.
After controlling for these state-level differ-
ences, we find that opposition to same-sex mar-
riage tends to be higher in counties with low
percentages of women working in the labor
force, high levels of occupational sex segrega-
tion, and high percentages of households made
up of married couples with children. Also as
expected, opposition tends to be lower in coun-
ties with higher percentages of nontraditional
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8 We calculated all of our variables at the state level
for all 50 states and compared the mean values of
states that have had same-sex marriage initiatives
with those of states that have not. We found that the
mean values of the following variables are signifi-
cantly higher in states that have had a ballot initia-
tive: Republican voting, crime rate, percent
Evangelical, and residential instability. For these
same states, the mean values are significantly lower
for the following variables: percent Catholic, medi-
an age, median income, percent professional occu-
pations, and percent unmarried, opposite-sex
households.
9 To obtain the results presented in Table 2, we esti-
mated models using Ordinary Least Squares regres-
sion. We manually inserted state-level dummy
variables so that state-level effects could be observed
and compared. In subsequent tables, we estimated
fixed-effects models using the AREG command in
Stata.
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VOTING TO BAN SAME-SEX MARRIAGE—–901
Table 2. Percent Approving Same-Sex Marriage Ban; OLS Estimates, U.S. Counties
Independent Variable .01 .02 .03 .04
Percent Women Not Working in Labor Force .152** .170** .075* .090*
Occupational Sex Segregation 16.310*** 18.048*** 8.216*** 9.559***
Percent Households Married with Children .219* .322*** .156** .217***
Percent Same-Sex Households –2.038 –2.237 –5.428*** –5.956***
Percent Unmarried Opposite-Sex Households –1.682*** –1.720*** –1.314*** –1.210***
Residential Instability –.033 –.024 –.083** –.066*
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied –.076* –.084* –.079*** –.109***
Crime Rate .099*** .022*
Percent Production or Construction Occupations .194*** .234*** .067** .063*
Percent Professional Occupations –.178* –.100 –.118* –.119*
Percent Self-Employed –.100 –.093 –.198*** –.234***
Median Family Income ($1,000s) –.138*** –.045 –.166*** –.148***
Percent Receiving Public Assistance –.054 .037 .125 .207
Mean Years of Education –1.328* –2.611*** –2.040*** –2.606***
Percent Enrolled in College –.060 .020 –.185** –.139
Population Density (logged) –.111 –.332 .001 .040
Percent Urban .029** .011 .015** .011
Republican Voting (percent Bush 2000) .350*** .381*** .287*** .317***
Percent Evangelical .180*** .179*** .031*** .020
Percent Catholic .063*** .064*** –.025** –.035**
Median Age –.155 –.022 –.314*** –.247**
Percent African American .092*** .085*** –.006 .009
Percent Latino .043* .024 –.108*** –.118***
LGBT Organizations –.114 .974 –2.096*** –1.576**
Civil Rights Organizations –.007 –.004 .073 .113
Antidiscrimination Legislation –3.283*** –2.797*** –2.656*** –1.918*
Alabama –6.679*** –6.132***
Arizona –23.814*** –23.878***
Arkansas –9.454*** –9.085***
California –2.079* –1.867*
Colorado –13.112*** –12.478***
Florida –7.906*** –8.263***
Georgia –2.787*** –3.307***
Idaho –17.638*** –17.591***
Kansas –5.857*** –6.051***
Kentucky –7.623*** –9.111***
Louisiana –4.771*** –5.492***
Michigan –15.107*** –15.211***
Mississippi –2.865*** –1.619
Missouri –5.502*** –5.583***
Montana –8.701*** –8.893***
Nebraska –5.916*** –5.754***
Nevada –3.886*** –3.964***
North Dakota –4.316*** –4.057***
Ohio –13.621*** –13.853***
Oklahoma –8.002*** –7.835***
Oregon –10.999*** –10.574***
South Carolina –3.390*** –3.947***
South Dakota –30.373*** –29.254***
Tennessee –1.166 –.920
Utah –18.009*** –18.697***
Virginia –17.326*** –17.351***
Wisconsin –12.236*** –11.792***
Texas (basis of comparison)
Number of Observations 2,231 1,602 2,231 1,602
R-Square .713 .735 .909 .915
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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households, as indicated by higher percentages
of same-sex partner households and higher per-
centages of unmarried, opposite-sex-partner
households.
After controlling for other variables, resi-
dential instability and low rates of home-own-
ership have a negative effect on the dependent
variable. As we argued above, weak communi-
ty cohesion should not, by itself, generate oppo-
sition to same-sex marriage, as weak ties can
reduce pressure toward conformity and pro-
mote greater appreciation for individuality
(Durkheim 1933; Simmel 1950). We argue that
these conditions contribute to opposition in
locations where traditional family structure and
gender roles shape residents’ perceptions in a
way that makes them likely to view same-sex
marriage as a threat to both their own interests
and values and the community. However, net of
other variables, high crime rates are associated
with greater opposition to same-sex marriage.
Among our control variables, opposition to
same-sex marriage tends to be stronger in less
prosperous counties. Opposition is stronger in
counties with high percentages of blue-collar
occupations and lower in counties with high
percentages of professional occupations and
households receiving self-employment income.
Opposition also tends to be lower in counties
with a high median income, high levels of edu-
cational attainment, and high percentages of
residents enrolled in college. Our measure of
public assistance income, however, falls short
of statistical significance.
Although bivariate correlations indicate that
opposition to same sex marriage is weaker in
densely populated and urbanized counties, when
other controls are included in the model the
population density measure is not statistically
significant, and the measure of urbanization is
positive and significant in models using the full
set of cases. As expected, Republican voting
and our measure of Evangelical adherents have
positive and significant effects on the depend-
ent variable, although the measure of
Evangelical adherence falls short of statistical
significance in the models that include the crime
variable with a limited sample of observations.
Counties with high percentages of Catholics
show less opposition to same-sex marriage.
After controlling for state effects and other vari-
ables, median age is negatively related to the
dependent variable. We also find less opposition
to same-sex marriage in counties with high pro-
portions of Latino residents, but only when
state-level effects are controlled. Counties with
at least one LGBT organization show less oppo-
sition to same-sex marriage, but our more gen-
eral measure of the presence of civil rights
organizations (not specifically focused on
LGBT concerns) is not a significant predictor
of the voting outcome. Not surprisingly, coun-
ties that enacted antidiscrimination legislation
based on sexual orientation tend to show less
opposition to same-sex marriage.
Results presented in Table 2 are consistent
with our expectation that opposition to same-sex
marriage should be stronger in counties char-
acterized by traditional family structure and
gender roles. These findings, while important to
understanding opposition to (and support for)
same-sex marriage, do not directly test our the-
oretical argument. We argued that the effects of
these measures of traditionalism should be espe-
cially strong in counties characterized by weak
community cohesion. In such counties, high
proportions of residents are likely to view same-
sex marriage as threatening to both their own
interests and values and the community at large.
We test these claims by examining a series of
interaction effects.
We first examine how residential instability
interacts with our measures of traditional fam-
ily structure and gender roles, while controlling
for state-level differences and numerous other
relevant variables. As column 1 of Table 3
shows, the coeff icient for the interaction
between residential instability and the percent-
age of women not in the labor force is highly sig-
nificant. The coefficient for the main effect of
the labor force participation variable indicates
that when residential instability is at its mean
value, the percentage of women not working in
the labor force has a significant and positive
effect on opposition to same-sex marriage. The
positive sign for the interaction term indicates
that the effect of our labor force participation
variable is stronger in counties with higher lev-
els of residential instability.
We find that occupational sex segregation
plays a particularly strong role in shaping vot-
ing outcomes. The interaction between sex seg-
regation and residential instability is positive and
highly significant. The main effect of the sex
segregation variable indicates that when resi-
dential instability is at its mean value, sex seg-
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regation has a strong, positive effect on oppo-
sition to same-sex marriage. A one-unit increase
in segregation, which represents a transition
from a completely integrated labor market to a
completely segregated labor market, produces
an expected 9.2 percent increase in votes
opposed to same-sex marriage. This effect is sig-
nificantly stronger in counties with high levels
of residential instability. Figure 1 depicts this
relationship, showing the predicted effect of
sex-segregated occupations on the vote against
same-sex marriage at varying levels of resi-
dential instability.
We observe similar patterns when we inter-
act residential instability with our measures of
family structure. Results in column 3 of Table
3 indicate that the coefficient for the interaction
of residential instability and percent married
with children is positive and significant. In this
case, the main effect for the married with chil-
dren variable is not significant, indicating that
percent married with children produces greater
opposition to same-sex marriage only in coun-
ties with higher-than-average levels of residen-
tial instability. As expected, we also find that the
negative effect of same-sex households on oppo-
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Table 3. Percent Approving Same-Sex Marriage Ban; Residential Instability Interacting with
Measures of Traditional Family Structure and Gender Roles
Variable .01 .02 .03 .04 .05
Percent Women Not Working in Labor Force .095** .092* .075* .077* .068
Occupational Sex Segregation 8.210*** 9.241*** 8.367*** 8.269*** 8.061***
Percent Households Married with Children .158** .145* .071 .141* .143*
Percent Same-Sex Households –5.101*** –5.183*** –5.210*** –5.537*** –5.210***
Percent Unmarried Opposite-Sex Households –1.380*** –1.324*** –1.359*** –1.330*** –1.416***
Residential Instability –.073** –.094*** –.104*** –.082*** –.084***
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied –.073*** –.069** –.087*** –.075*** –.078***
Percent Production or Construction Occupations .054* .057* .065** .065** .059*
Percent Professional Occupations –.105* –.119* –.121* –.119* –.139**
Percent Self-Employed –.211*** –.175*** –.181*** –.181*** –.183***
Median Family Income ($1,000s) –.148*** –.159*** –.159*** –.163*** –.167***
Percent Receiving Public Assistance .098 .092 .122 .110 .106
Mean Years of Education –2.092*** –1.879*** –2.052*** –2.035*** –2.105***
Percent Enrolled in College –.147* –.161** –.184** –.205*** –.187***
Population Density (logged) –.091 .050 .047 .054 .033
Percent Urban .012* .014** .015** .013* .015**
Republican Voting (percent Bush 2000) .271*** .284*** .292*** .283*** .284***
Percent Evangelical .029** .031*** .032*** .030** .032***
Percent Catholic –.026** –.024** –.022* –.025** –.024**
Median Age –.366*** –.343*** –.386*** –.328*** –.321***
Percent African American –.012 –.009 –.019 –.010 –.008
Percent Latino –.115*** –.102*** –.106*** –.107*** –.108***
LGBT Organizations –1.933*** –1.808*** –2.031*** –1.980*** –1.951***
Civil Rights Organizations .043 .064 .054 .088 .044
Antidiscrimination Legislation –2.284*** –2.356*** –2.619*** –2.310*** –2.292***
Residential Instability  Percent Women Not Working 
—in Labor Force
.011***
Residential Instability  Occupational Sex Segregation .708***
Residential Instability  Percent Married with Children .009**
Residential Instability  Same-Sex Households –.194*
Residential Instability  Unmarried Opposite-Sex 
—Households –.038***
Number of Observations 2,231 2,231 2,231 2,231 2,231
R-Square .912 .911 .910 .910 .910
Notes: Counties in the 28 states with same-sex marriage initiatives on the ballot from 2000 to 2008 are included.
Fixed effects estimates with controls for state-level effects (robust standard errors used for significance testing).
Variables are centered on their mean values.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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sition to same-sex marriage is significantly
stronger in counties with higher levels of resi-
dential instability. Or, looking at this relation
another way, having relatively few same-sex
households leads to more opposition to same-
sex marriage, especially in counties character-
ized by high levels of residential instability. We
obtain similar results when we interact resi-
dential instability with our measure of opposite-
sex-cohabiting households.
In support of our argument, we find that the
effect of traditional gender roles and family
structure on voting outcomes is particularly
strong in counties characterized by high rates of
residential instability. If our theoretical expla-
nation for these findings is sound, we should
obtain similar results when we interact our tra-
ditional gender role and family structure vari-
ables with other indicators of weak community
cohesion. Results in Table 4 show how low rates
of home ownership combine with traditional
gender roles and family structure to promote
strong opposition to same-sex marriage. The
Table 4 results are strikingly similar to those pre-
sented in Table 3, where we considered the role
of residential instability. As was true of resi-
dential instability, the positive effects of low
percentages of women in the labor force and of
occupational sex segregation, as well as high
percentages of households composed of a mar-
ried couple with children, are strongest in coun-
ties with low percentages of owner-occupied
housing. Likewise, the negative effects of same-
sex households and unmarried, opposite-sex
households are strongest in counties with low
rates of owner-occupancy.
As Table 5 indicates, the crime rate is simi-
lar to residential instability and low rates of
home ownership in terms of its role in affect-
ing voting outcomes. Here, we use a restricted
sample because of concerns about the quality of
the crime data for some counties.10 Results pre-
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Figure 1. The Effect of Occupational Sex Segregation on Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage at
Varying Levels of Residential Instability
10 We obtained results similar to those presented
in Tables 3 and 4 when we re-estimated those mod-
els with the more restricted sample of observations.
The signs of the coefficients for all interaction terms
were in the same direction. However, when using
the restricted sample, the coefficient for the interac-
tion of residential instability and same-sex households
falls short of statistical significance (p = .144), as
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sented in column 1 show that the percentage of
women not in the labor force has a positive and
significant effect on opposition to same-sex
marriage when the crime rate is set at its mean
value and that the effect is significantly stronger
in counties with higher crime rates. The same
pattern is seen when examining interactions
between occupational sex segregation and
crime, as well as percent married with children
and crime. In the latter case, however, the coef-
ficient of the interaction term is not significant
at the .05 level (p = .064). The coefficient for
the interaction of the crime rate and percent
same-sex households is also significant, indi-
cating that the negative effect of same-sex
households on opposition to same-sex marriage
is stronger in counties with high crime rates.
However, we find that the interaction of the
VOTING TO BAN SAME-SEX MARRIAGE—–905
Table 4. Percent Approving Same-Sex Marriage Ban; Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied
Interacting with Measures of Traditional Family Structure and Gender Roles
Variable .01 .02 .03 .04 .05
Percent Women Not Working in Labor Force .087* .067 .072* .077* .087*
Occupational Sex Segregation 8.829*** 9.165*** 8.509*** 8.347*** 8.232***
Percent Households Married with Children .102 .090 .101 .145** .131*
Percent Same-Sex Households –4.931*** –4.957*** –5.305*** –4.678*** –5.542***
Percent Unmarried Opposite-Sex Households –1.478*** –1.455*** –1.337*** –1.368*** –1.251***
Residential Instability –.059* –.072** –.091*** –.088*** –.090***
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied –.076** –.093*** –.093**** –.065** –.075**
Percent Production or Construction Occupations .075*** .073** .064** .073*** .063**
Percent Professional Occupations –.127** –.100* –.111* –.109* –.121*
Percent Self-Employed –.209*** –.181*** –.182*** –.185*** –.194***
Median Family Income ($1,000s) –.173*** –.176*** –.154*** –.164*** –.161***
Percent Receiving Public Assistance .068 .091 .136 .114 .153
Mean Years of Education –1.907*** –2.032*** –2.113*** –2.040*** –1.927***
Percent Enrolled in College –.140* –.183** –.193*** –.203*** –.206***
Population Density (logged) –.024 .119 .050 .036 .023
Percent Urban .012* .014* .016** .014** .013*
Republican Voting (percent Bush 2000) .277*** .284*** .291*** .283*** .287***
Percent Evangelical .031*** .029** .030*** .030*** .031***
Percent Catholic –.023* –.025** –.025** –.025** –.024**
Median Age –.360*** –.380*** –.374*** –.327*** –.358***
Percent African American –.019 –.010 –.009 –.010 –.012
Percent Latino –.110*** –.106*** –.110*** –.110*** –.110***
LGBT Organizations –1.754*** –1.836*** –2.130*** –2.156*** –2.065***
Civil Rights Organizations .066 .162 .076 .176 .074
Antidiscrimination Legislation –2.060** –2.297*** –2.594*** –2.500*** –2.406***
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied  Percent 
—Women Not Working in Labor Force
.012***
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied  Occupational 
—Sex Segregation
.682***
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied  Percent 
—Married with Children
.005*
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied  Same-Sex 
—Households
–.149*
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied  Unmarried 
—Opposite-Sex Households
–.024*
Number of Observations 2,231 2,231 2,231 2,231 2,231
R-Square .912 .911 .910 .910 .910
Notes: Counties in the 28 states with same-sex marriage initiatives on the ballot from 2000 to 2008 are included.
Fixed effects estimates with controls for state-level effects (robust standard errors used for significance testing).
Variables are centered on their mean values.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
does the coefficient for the interaction between home
ownership and same-sex households (p = .061).
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crime rate and our measure of unmarried, oppo-
site-sex households is not statistically signifi-
cant.11
DISCUSSION
For several decades, and especially in recent
years, same-sex marriage has been a hotly con-
tested public issue in the United States. The fight
will certainly continue. Recent court rulings in
California and New York have favored proponents
of same-sex marriage, yet opponents continue to
leverage public opinion by using ballot initiatives
to ban same-sex marriage through amendments
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Table 5. Percent Approving Same-Sex Marriage Ban; Crime Rate Interacting with Measures of
Traditional Family Structure and Gender Roles
Variable .01 .02 .03 .04 .05
Percent Women Not Working in Labor Force .097* .079 .094* .089* .092*
Occupational Sex Segregation 10.040*** 12.380*** 10.270*** 10.050*** 9.912***
Percent Households Married with Children .186** .205** .229*** .212*** .217***
Percent Same-Sex Households –5.792*** –5.591*** –5.745*** –5.860*** –5.877***
Percent Unmarried Opposite-Sex Households –1.245*** –1.317*** –1.246*** –1.230*** –1.222***
Residential Instability –.066* –.073** –.067* –.069* –.067*
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied –.106*** –.079*** –.098*** –.105*** –.107***
Crime Rate .023* .033*** .029** .027** .026*
Percent Production or Construction Occupations .059* .055 .063* .063* .060*
Percent Professional Occupations –.119* –.127* –.118* –.123* –.124*
Percent Self-Employed –.239*** –.215*** –.227*** –.221*** –.230***
Median Family Income ($1,000s) –.146*** –.157*** –.151*** –.152*** –.150***
Percent Receiving Public Assistance .190 .213 .197 .198 .185
Mean Years of Education –2.533*** –2.414*** –2.560*** –2.575*** –2.594***
Percent Enrolled in College –.161* –.160* –.148* –.147 –.141**
Population Density (logged) .037 .129 .037 .098 .043
Percent Urban .010 .008 .011 .010 .011
Republican Voting (percent Bush 2000) .314*** .315*** .314*** .315*** .315***
Percent Evangelical .020 .020 .019 .018 .020
Percent Catholic –.035** –.035** –.034** –.035** –.034**
Median Age –.285*** –.250** –.256** –.257** –.253**
Percent African American .003 .010 .011 –.009 .008
Percent Latino –.118*** –.112*** –.126*** –.120*** –.120***
LGBT Organizations –1.401* –1.088 –1.489** –1.534** –1.541**
Civil Rights Organizations .113 .149 .109 .169 .112
Antidiscrimination Legislation –1.902* –1.689* –1.800* –1.687* –1.823*
Crime Rate  Percent Women Not Working in Labor 
—Force
.003*
Crime Rate  Occupational Sex Segregation .422***
Crime Rate  Percent Married with Children .003
Crime Rate  Same-Sex Households –.082*
Crime Rate  Unmarried Opposite-Sex Households –.006
Number of Observations 1,602 1,602 1,602 1,602 1,602
R-Square .916 .917 .916 .916 .915
Notes: Counties in the 28 states with same-sex marriage initiatives on the ballot from 2000 to 2008 are included.
Fixed effects estimates with controls for state-level effects (robust standard errors used for significance testing).
Variables are centered on their mean values.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
11 We obtained similar results when we applied less
restrictive standards for data quality. For example, if
we include all cases for which the coverage index is
70 or above and where 70 percent of the county pop-
ulation is covered by reporting agencies, we can
include a total of 1,768 counties, rather than 1,602.
The results are essentially the same, except that when
the less restrictive sample is used, the interaction
between the crime rate and the percent of house-
holds with a married couple and children is statisti-
cally significant.
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to state constitutions. Although most of these
electoral battles have been contested in states
where voters are relatively conservative and tend
to align with Republican candidates, same-sex
marriage opponents have demonstrated that they
can also win battles in Democratic strongholds
such as California and Michigan. Holding state-
level differences constant, we sought to identify
features of local settings that account for vary-
ing levels of support for and opposition to same-
sex marriage.
Counties characterized by traditional family
structures and gender roles tend to show strong
opposition to same-sex marriage. We also find
that the effects of traditional family structure
and gender roles are significantly stronger where
community cohesion is weak, as indicated by
residential instability, low rates of home owner-
ship, and high crime rates. We explained these
findings by arguing that traditional gender roles
and family structures in local settings create a sit-
uation in which many residents are likely to view
same-sex marriage as threatening to their inter-
ests and values. In such contexts, the prevalence
of traditional arrangements means that individ-
ual perceptions of threat are likely to be contin-
ually reinforced through social interaction, as
individuals interact on a regular basis with oth-
ers who share similar views by virtue of their
shared circumstances. These conditions, we
argue, predispose community members to per-
ceive same-sex marriage as a threat to the com-
munity, particularly in locations where
community cohesion is already in peril.
In making these arguments, we drew on two
different strands in the literature that aim to explain
the more general issue of prejudice based on sex-
ual orientation. One strain emphasizes how indi-
viduals who enact traditional gender roles have a
vested interest in maintaining the status quo, as
they view same-sex marriage and public accept-
ance of homosexuality as threatening to their own
interests. The other strain emphasizes communi-
ty characteristics and suggests that sexual-orien-
tation prejudice reflects, in part, a reaction to
social disorganization and weak community cohe-
sion, which can generate feelings of distrust and
intolerance of difference. Our research indicates
that it is important to examine how these two
general conditions (traditional gender roles and
weak community cohesion) work together to pro-
duce varying levels of opposition to same-sex
marriage. Our measures of residential instability
and low home-ownership, by themselves, are
each associated with lower levels of opposition to
same-sex marriage, which should not be surpris-
ing. In local contexts where there is no broad
consensus concerning the sanctity of the tradi-
tional family, the fight against same-sex mar-
riage is likely to be viewed as an unnecessary
distraction. Rather than perceiving same-sex mar-
riage as a prime threat to the community, residents
may be more inclined to see deficient schools,
poverty, or discrimination as the most pressing
community problems.
Although we did not focus on economic cir-
cumstances when making our theoretical argu-
ment, our analyses do show that opposition to
same-sex marriage tends to be stronger in less
prosperous counties. More specifically, hold-
ing other factors constant, opposition to same-
sex marriage tends to be weaker in counties
with high median family incomes, higher lev-
els of education, and higher percentages of the
population enrolled in college and employed in
professional occupations. Opposition tends to
be stronger in counties with higher percent-
ages of workers employed in production and
construction occupations, and where higher
percentages of households receive public assis-
tance income (although the latter finding is
not statistically significant).
These findings might be reconciled with a
threat-based argument, such as the one we made
above. Where there is economic deprivation
and limited opportunities for social mobility,
community residents are more likely to perceive
themselves as vulnerable to economic compe-
tition that may result when discriminatory bar-
riers are lifted (Bernstein et al. 2003; Persell et
al. 2001; Stein 2001). Other researchers, how-
ever, might characterize these findings as an
example of low-status backlash. Theories of
status politics and status substitution, for exam-
ple, propose that the demand for “moral
reform” comes from individuals who feel com-
pelled to assert the superiority of their own
way of life as a way of compensating for their
limited or declining economic power and influ-
ence (see Gusfield 1963; Lipset and Raab
1970). In this perspective, the negative orien-
tation toward same-sex marriage has less to do
with threats to privileges and advantages
enjoyed by some heterosexuals, and more to do
with resentment and frustration expressed by
those who are not prospering economically.
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Although our data do not allow us to settle
this dispute definitively, we think that it is dan-
gerous to assume that coercive moralism is the
exclusive property of the economically disad-
vantaged. In her study of the late-1800s’ anti-
vice movement, for example, Beisel (1997:4)
shows that the movement’s success can be
explained, in part, by the way that “its leaders
connected concerns about the moral corruption
of children, occasioned by changes in gender
roles and the social meaning of sexuality, to
threats to the social position of the upper and
middle classes.” In the same way, we expect
that in local settings where traditional gender
roles and family structures are accompanied by
prosperity, the perception of threat may be
heightened, rather than reduced, because indi-
viduals with a vested interest in maintaining
traditional arrangements have a greater stake in
the outcome.
To test this proposition, we estimated 30 sep-
arate models examining interactions between
each of our five measures of traditionalism and
six measures of prosperity. Rather than present
the full results of 30 different models, we sum-
marize the results pertaining to the interac-
tion effects in Table 6.12 The coefficient for the
interaction term is statistically significant in all
but 4 of our 30 models. The results indicate that
although prosperity is related to less opposition
to same-sex marriage, the positive effects of
our measures of traditionalism on opposition to
same-sex marriage are strongest in more pros-
perous counties. Looking at the cell in the top-
left-hand corner of Table 6, for example, we
see that a high percentage of women not in the
labor force is significantly related to opposition
to same-sex marriage when our measure of
median income is set at its mean level, and that
the effect is stronger in counties with higher-
than-average median income. Figure 2 displays
this same relation graphically. As the figure
shows, opposition to same-sex marriage tends
to be high in low-income counties regardless of
the extent of women’s participation in the labor
force. Opposition is lowest in counties with
high median incomes and high proportions of
women participating in the paid labor force.
Yet in counties where roughly 50 percent of
women do not participate in the labor force,
opposition to same-sex marriage is just as strong
among high- and low-income counties.
CONCLUSIONS
A majority of U.S. citizens oppose same-sex
marriage, and this opposition can be strong
even in locations where residents tend to be
prosperous and highly educated. Yet support
and opposition vary substantially across local
contexts. In this article, we account for that
variation by considering how the organization
of social life in local settings influences the
extent to which community residents view
same-sex marriage as threatening to both their
own interests and the community at large. We
focus on counties as units of analysis, rather than
individuals, because perceptions of threat should
depend to a large extent on the type of com-
munity in which an individual is embedded. In
Martin County, Texas, for example, where 95
percent of voters approved of a ban on same-sex
marriage, sex differences are established and
reinforced through the organization of eco-
nomic and family life. Nearly one half of adult
women (46.7 percent) reported that they did
not work in the paid labor force. Women who
did work labored within a highly sex-segregat-
ed market. Based on our data, approximately 75
percent of women would have to switch occu-
pational categories to produce an even distri-
bution of women across all categories. The
perceived reality in such a setting, regardless of
individual attributes, is undoubtedly very dif-
ferent from that in Boulder County, Colorado,
where only 33 percent of voters supported the
ban. In Boulder, 75 percent of women work in
the labor force and less than 40 percent of those
women would have to change occupational cat-
egories to produce a perfectly integrated labor
market.
Our structural approach in this article has its
limits. Most importantly, in seeking to identify
patterns of voting outcomes at the county level,
we do not directly observe the micro-level
processes that produce these patterns. However,
we think that attempts to identify micro-level
processes are facilitated by knowledge of macro-
level patterns. We hope that our work will stim-
ulate more research at both the micro- and
macro-levels, and we hope this research will
help us better understand why a majority of
Americans continue to feel justified in denying
908—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
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marriage rights to same-
sex couples.
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APPENDIX:
MEASUREMENT
OF INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES AND
SOURCES OF
DATA
Percent of Women Not in
Labor Force: Calculated
as the percent of women
age 16 and over who
reported that they did
not work in 1999. Data
taken from the 2000
U.S. Census (Table SF
3 P47).
Occupational Sex
Segregation: An index
of dissimilarity calcu-
lated using the 93 minor
occupational groups
reported in the 2000
U.S. Census (Table SF4
P86). See McVeigh and
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Sobolewski (2007) for a more detailed discus-
sion of the measure.
Percent Households Married with Children:
Households composed of a married couple with
children under 18 years of age, with the house-
holder between age 15 and 64, as percent of all
households. Data taken from the 2000 U.S.
Census (Table SF1 P20).
Percent Same-Sex Households: Percent of
all households reporting a male householder
and a male partner or a female householder
with a female partner. Data taken from the 2000
U.S. Census (Table SF4 PCT21).
Percent Unmarried, Opposite-Sex
Households: Percent of all households report-
ing an unmarried male householder and a female
partner or an unmarried female householder
and a male partner. Data taken from the 2000
U.S. Census (Table SF4 PCT 21).
Residential Instability: Percent of individu-
als age 5 years and older who are living in a dif-
ferent residence than the residence in which
they lived five years earlier. Data obtained from
the 2000 U.S. Census (Table SF3 P24).
Percent Homes Not Owner Occupied: Percent
of housing units not occupied by the owner.
Data obtained from the 2000 U.S. Census (Table
SF3 H7).
Crime Rate: Number of index crimes per
every 1,000 county residents. Data taken from
the 2000 Uniform Crime Report. We accessed
the data through a Web site administered by the
Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR). For a more detailed
discussion of the crime measure, see the text of
this article or McVeigh (2006).
Percent Production or Construction
Occupations: Number of individuals employed
in “construction, extraction, and maintenance”
occupations or “production, transportation, and
material moving” occupations, as a percent of
the employed civilian population age 16 and
over. The occupational categories are based on
the Standard Occupational Classif ication
Manual. Data taken from the 2000 U.S. Census
(Table SF4 P86).
Percent Professional Occupations: Number
of individuals employed in “professional and
related occupations” as a percent of the
employed civilian population age 16 and over.
The occupational category is based on the
Standard Occupational Classification Manual.
Figure 2. The Effect of Percent of Women Not in Labor Force on Opposition to Same-Sex
Marriage at Varying Levels of Median Income

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Data taken from the 2000 U.S. Census (Table
SF4 P86).
Percent Self-Employed: Percent of house-
holds receiving self-employment income in
1999. Data taken from the 2000 U.S. Census
(Table SF3 P60).
Median Family Income ($1,000s): Median
family income (thousands of dollars) in 1999,
as reported in the 2000 U.S. Census (Table SF
3 P77).
Percent Receiving Public Assistance: Percent
of households receiving public assistance
income in 1999. Data taken from the 2000 U.S.
Census (Table SF3 P64).
Mean Years of Education: We calculated the
mean years of educational attainment for indi-
viduals age 25 and over, using data from the
2000 U.S. Census (Table S4 PCT64). We aggre-
gated the data into the following seven cate-
gories: (1) 0 to 4 years, (2) 5 to 8 years, (3) 9 to
11 years, (4) 12 years, (5) 13 to 15 years, (6) 16
years, and (7) more than 16 years. To calculate
a mean, we used the midpoint of the first six cat-
egories. We used a value of 19 as the midpoint
of the open-ended category.
Percent Enrolled in College: Percent of pop-
ulation age 3 years and over currently enrolled
in college (including undergraduate, graduate,
and professional school). Data taken from the
2000 U.S. Census (Table SF4 PCT61).
Population Density (logged): Natural log of
the total population per square mile. Data taken
from the 2000 U.S. Census (Table SF1 P1).
Percent Urban: Percent of total population
residing in an urban location. Data taken from
the 2000 U.S. Census (Table SF1 P2).
Republican Voting: Percent of total votes cast
in the 2000 presidential election for Republican
candidate George W. Bush. Voting data taken
from America Votes (Scammon, McGillivray,
and Cook 2001).
Percent Evangelical: Number of individuals
who are adherents of Evangelical Protestant
denominations as a percentage of all church
adherents. Figures are for the year 2000. Data
taken from Churches and Church Membership
in the United States, 2000, published by the
Glenmary Research Center. We accessed the
data set through the American Religious Data
Archive.
Percent Catholic: Number of individuals who
are Catholic as a percentage of all church adher-
ents. Figures are for the year 2000. Data taken
from Churches and Church Membership in the
United States, 2000, published by the Glenmary
Research Center. We accessed the data set
through the American Religious Data Archive.
Median Age: Median age of all residents in
a county. Data taken from the 2000 U.S. Census
(Table SF1 P13).
Percent African American: Number of indi-
viduals identifying as Black or African
American (alone) as a percentage of the total
population. Data taken from the 2000 U.S.
Census (Table SF1 P3).
Percent Latino: Number of individuals iden-
tifying as Latino as a percentage of the total pop-
ulation. Data taken from the 2000 U.S. Census
(Table SF3 P7).
LGBT Organizations: A dichotomous vari-
able coded 1 if a county has at least one Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, or Transgender (LGBT) organ-
ization listed under the “Act Locally” link of the
Web site of the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force. We downloaded data from the site on
October 28, 2008 (http://www.thetaskforce.
org/activist_center/act_locally).
Civil Rights Organizations: Number of
activist organizations in a county pursuing civil
rights causes that are listed in data collected by
the National Center for Charitable Statistics.
We include all organizations coded from R20 to
R30 according to the National Taxonomy for
Exempt Entities coding scheme. See McVeigh
(2006) for a more complete description of the
measurement of this variable.
Antidiscrimination Legislation: A dichoto-
mous variable coded 1 if a county (or a city with-
in the county) enacted legislation prohibiting
discrimination in private employment based on
sexual orientation or gender identity prior to the
year 2000. Data on cities and counties with
antidiscrimination legislation come from
Legislating Equality: A Review of Laws Affecting
Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgendered
People in the United States. The report was
published in 2000 by the Policy Institute of the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force.
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